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Abstract: In this article, we study short and long-run effects of trade openness in services on 
wage inequalities between different points of the income distribution. The sample covers 10 
OECD countries from 1980 to 2005. We find a differentiated impact of trade in goods 
compared to trade in services: while trade in goods has a short and a long-run impact on 
inequalities, trade in services has only long-run effects. We also find that international trade in 
services enhances inequalities in a stronger way than international trade in goods. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the seminal empirical studies of Katz and Murphy (1992) and Lawrence and 
Slaughter (1993), many papers attempt to estimate the impact of international trade on 
inequalities. But existing empirical studies focus only on international trade in manufactured 
goods, while, to our knowledge, no paper examines the specific case of international trade in 
services. These sectors have traditionally been treated in economics as sectors whose outputs 
are purely non-tradable. In the last two decades, the telecommunications revolution has 
changed the basic nature of activities that can be traded: even if some services (like family 
doctors) are non tradable, others (such as call centers) have become tradable without 
additional cost, whatever the distance (Head et al., 2009). According to the OECD, services 
account for more than 20% of international exchanges. Services are strongly concerned by 
outsourcing (OECD, 2004; UNCTAD, 2004): multinational firms shift central office (back 
office) activities away from high wage centers in the OECD countries to back office service 
centers in places like India. Large shares of services jobs are now “at risk” of being off shored 
to low-wage countries and even highly-educated workers may face competition from their 
counterparts in poor countries. The acceleration of international trade (and particularly in 
services) in the last decades is concomitant to surges in inequality for some countries. 
International trade in services can thus no longer be discarded and may have contributed to 
the growth in inequality.  
 
In this article, we re-examine the empirical evidence for the impact of international trade on 
inequality by using an annual panel data set for 10 northern countries over 26 years. We deal 
with economic inequality that comprises all disparities in the distribution of economic assets 
and income among individuals within a country. More precisely, we focus on wage 
inequalities between high paid workers and low paid workers. Our contribution is two-fold. 
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First, we investigate the specific influence of trade openness in services by distinguishing 
trade in goods from trade in services. Second, the long-term period of our dataset allows us to 
study the long-run relationship between openness and inequalities. We estimate an Error 
Correction Model (ECM) to explain the observed short run variations of the dependent 
variable and to determine the speed at which inequalities come back to long-run equilibrium 
levels, once they violate the long-run equilibrium relationship1. 
 
Results of our empirical investigation are clear-cut. First, we establish a long-run and a short-
run relationship between international trade and inequalities. Second, we show that the 
relation between international trade and inequalities differs between goods and services: in the 
long run, trade in commercial services increases inequalities not only between top-income and 
low-income workers, but also between median income and top-income workers, whereas this 
latter effect is not verified for the goods sector. Third, in the short-run, international trade in 
services has no significant impact on inequalities.  
                                                 
1 From an econometric point of view, we find a long run relationship between cointegrated variables: in this 
case, there exist fundamental economic forces that make the variables move together stochastically over time 
and their stochastic trends are linked as a long-run equilibrium. In the short run, some shocks lead to a deviation 
from the long-relationship that is to say to a discrepancy between observed and equilibrium states: the ECM 
explains the short run consequences of these shocks on the dependent variable and gives the rate at which 
variables eventually converge to the long run equilibrium. From an economic point of view, introduce 
differentiation into impacts of short vs long run may notably be justified by the fact that institutions, through 
national or international regulations may, in the short or the medium run, introduce rigidities of salaries, their 
evolutions being from a ‘sluggish’ form (for a recent reference, see Sommer, 2009) 
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2. From Theory to Empirics 
Traditional explanations for the link between international trade and inequalities are mainly 
based on trade in manufactured goods between southern and northern countries. In the well-
known ricardian framework, free trade predicts that the national income increases compared 
to the autarky situation. In that respect, increase in trade enhances the economic welfare for 
the members of the society. Nevertheless, some members of the society may suffer from 
harmful effects, especially the low paid jobs in developed countries. For those who lose from 
free trade, some compensation may apply, or the expanding industries may offer them a new 
job. Hence, international trade effects correspond to a positive sum game at the State level. 
However, the issue of inequalities is missing in the ricardian framework. The effect of 
international trade on inequalities is predicted by the HOS framework (via the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem) which does not contradict the prediction of Ricardo, concerning the 
effect of free trade on national income. The seminal two-countries Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) framework provides theoretical support for rising inequality: as a country 
exports the good for which it uses the abundant factor intensively, trade increases the price of 
this good. This entails an increase in the relative price of the abundant factor in the production 
of the traded good (a decrease in the remuneration in the scarce factor): for northern countries, 
this framework predicts a rise in inequalities throught the skill premium (Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem). Furthermore, new mechanisms have been proposed to explain the effect of 
international trade on inequality (see the survey by Chusseau et al., 2008): (i) international 
outsourcing, (ii) capital-skill complementary, (iii) competition-enhancing trade liberalization. 
The latter is particularly relevant in the case of north-north trade. Nevertheless, most of these 
explanations are based on theoretical models with manufactured goods. In spite of the 
liberalization of services and the growing share of these activities in international trade, the 
effect of international trade in services on inequality has been rarely studied.  
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Two approaches are used to analyze the link between trade in services and inequalities. The 
first approach focuses on the impact of sectoral evolutions on wage inequalities (Askenazy, 
2005; Blum, 2008; Anwar, 2010). In an extension of the HOS framework, Askenazy (2005) 
introduces one southern country which produces manufactured goods and one northern 
country that produces services and R&D, provided by non-skilled and skilled workers 
respectively. However, in this model, services are supposed to be non-tradable. In this case, 
the non-skilled workers are protected from international competition. If the R&D activity has 
decreasing returns to scale and if households consume a large share of non-traded services, 
then international trade reduces wage inequalities. Blum (2008) proposes a multi-sector model 
of international trade to measure the effects of changes in the sectoral composition of an 
economy. The economy is composed of one tradable sector (manufacturing), and of one non-
tradable sector (services, wholesale trade and retail trade). Capital is assumed to be 
complementary to unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector, but complementary to 
skilled workers in the non-tradable sector. Hence, reallocation of capital from manufacturing 
to services favors skilled workers relatively to unskilled workers. Similarly, Anwar (2010) 
show in a 3-sector (agriculture, industry, services) economy how sectoral evolutions may 
impact inequalities in the short or in the long run. Notably, a decrease in the services sector’s 
fixed costs decreases wage inequality in the short run if the income share of capital in the 
primary sector is relatively large, but also in the long run, due to the presence of external 
economies. However, services are always considered as non-tradable in these models. As our 
objective is to measure the effect of international liberalization in services on inequalities, we 
implicitly suppose that commercial services are tradable. As a consequence, these models 
seem not to be appropriate to provide a theoretical framework for our results. The second 
approach lies on the theoretical model developed by Markusen and Strand (2008) that 
includes tradable services activities. The standard HOS model is extended by allowing one 
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good to geographically fragment into two separate production activities, one in each country. 
Moreover, one of those two activities is a service activity, and may be allowed to 
geographically fragment into a more skilled-labor-intensive “headquarters” activity and a less 
skilled intensive “office” activity. Besides low-skilled workers, two types of skilled workers 
are assumed: routine medium-skilled workers who can work at a geographic distance from the 
firm’s headquarters, and upper level workers involved in fundamental tasks for the firm. This 
model predicts that medium-skilled activities, that can be codified and routinized, will tend to 
migrate to offshore locations, whereas higher skilled activities will stay and expand in high-
income countries. As a consequence, international trade in services not only brings higher 
wage inequalities between skilled and non-skilled workers, but also between high-skilled and 
medium-skilled workers. 
Other arguments provide explanation of the indirect link between trade in services and 
inequality. According to Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001, 2005), the liberalization of trade 
in services has led to a surge in outsourcing for low-skilled and medium-skilled activities. In 
addition, international differentiation on varieties and competition on quality, enhance the 
demand for skilled labor, and lead to a rise in the skill premium2 (Manasse and Turrini, 2001). 
All these arguments suggest that trade in services increases inequalities between different 
points of the income distribution.  
 
In the empirical literature, there is much evidence that international trade affect inequalities. 
For example, using top income share as an inequalities variable, Roine et al. (2009) establish 
a difference across groups of countries: increased trade is associated with increased top 
incomes in Anglo-Saxon countries, but not in continental Europe. Among studies 
                                                 
2 Note that this mechanism may apply for both goods and services. Fontagné and Freundenberg (2002) had 
shown that two-way trades in goods are concerned by the two types of product differentiation: varieties and 
qualities. For the services, in despite of the difficulty to measure the quality, there is some evidence that these 
activities are also concerned by these two types of differentiation, as for example in tourism services (Fleischer 
and Rivlin, 2009). 
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encompassing countries from all regions of the world, Higgins and Williamson (2002) find 
little support for the hypothesis that international trade and globalization affect inequalities. 
Replacing trade openness with tariffs, the relationship between tariffs and inequalities differ 
according to relative factors endowments. Milanovic and Squire (2005) find that tariff 
reduction is associated with higher wage inequalities in poorer countries and lower 
inequalities in richer countries. More precisely, Gourdon et al. (2008) explicitly show that 
endowments matter in the direction of the relationship between tariffs and inequality: 
openness is associated with increases in inequality in countries that are relatively well-
endowed on capital and on highly skilled workers, while it is associated with decreases in 
inequality in countries relatively well-endowed on unskilled workers. Recently, Onaran 
(2011) uses panel data of the manufacturing industry to show a negative but low effect of 
imports on employment and wages.  
This last paragraph shows that empirical papers mainly deals with trade openness in goods. 
One important contribution of this article is to investigate the specific influence of trade 
openness in services. 
 
3.  Data 
In this section, we present the variables employed in this article. Table A.1 in the appendix 
reports the summary statistics and the sources of the data. The aim of this article is to test 
whether international trade has an impact on inequalities using a balanced panel of ten OECD 
countries over the 1980-2005 period. Although the size of the cross-section is limited to ten 
countries3, due to data availability, this limitation also ensures that we study countries with 
comparable factor endowments and technology levels (see Gourdon et al., 2008). In this 
article, and for availability reasons, we focus on interdecile ratios as inequality indicators 
                                                 
3 Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States. 
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(INEQ). These indicators are pertinent to study inequalities between different groups of 
incomes. We use three interdecile ratios: D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1, to ensure detailed 
observation of inequalities. The ratios D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1 for wages stand for interdecile 
ratios4 which represents inequalities between different points of the distribution of income. 
D9/D1 represents a measure of inequalities between higher and lower wages. D9/D5 is a 
measure of inequalities between higher and medium wages, while D5/D1 corresponds to a 
measure of inequalities between medium and low wages. 
Our main explanatory variable is the scholar openness indicator (total of imports and exports 
for a country divided by its income). As we focus on developed countries, a positive impact 
on inequality could be expected. If the mechanisms presented in section 2 apply, we expect a 
positive impact of openness for goods, for services, and for both sectors altogether, on our 
three inequality indicators. 
Contrary to the existing literature, we do not only examine the impact of the trade in goods on 
inequality, but also the impact of trade in services. In the CHELEM-CEPII5 database, three 
principal entries of services are distinguished: (i) transport services (flying, shipping and other 
charges for passengers and for freight) ; (ii) travel services (restoration services, 
accommodation services, animation services and services through tour-operators) ; (iii) “other 
commercial services” (communication services, construction, insurance, financial services, 
informatics and information services, fees and patents, other services for firms, cultural 
services, and public administrations). According to Markusen and Strand (2008), the policy 
                                                 
4 The wage deciles are threshold inside the ordered distribution of wages inside a given population: the first 
decile (D1) represents the threshold under which stands the 10% of the population who represents the ‘lower 
wages’, the 5th decile (the median, D5) represents the threshold under which stands the 50% of the population 
who represents the ‘lower wages’, the 9th decile (D9) represents the threshold below which stands the 10% of the 
population who represents the higher wages. 
5 The CEPII’s CHELEM-BAL database contains balance of payments statistics for numerous countries and 
allows several indicators to be calculated (especially on trade openness). This database has been built by the 
CEPII (French research center in international economics) since the early eighties and gives the possibility to 
study the specifics of the service sector. The service accounts are displayed at the most detailed level of the IMF 
fifth manual of the balance of payments. 
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debate focuses on commercial services. For this reason, we only deal with this last category of 
services.  
 
International trade may hardly be considered as the only vector of inequality: several control 
variables must be introduced. 
Foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment corresponds to international financial 
flows leading to the creation of direct, stable and long links between economies. FDI can be 
seen as a substitute or complement for the other openness variables. FDI stocks can also be 
viewed as contributing to the stock of general-purpose technology available in the economy.  
Education. We use a variable of skill supply which corresponds to the average years of 
schooling of the total population aged 25 and over. Education is expected to have a negative 
impact on inequalities: an increase in education means more abundant skills in the economy, 
so a decrease in the relative skilled/unskilled wage, and a decrease in the overall income 
inequality.  
Gross domestic product per capita. Gross domestic product per capita may have an impact 
on inequalities, according to the mechanism initially exposed by Kuznets (1955)6. The 
relationship between inequalities and economic development would follow an inverted U-
pattern: inequalities within countries have been observed as increasing in the early stage of 
development, and decreasing in the latter. There is no consensus on these results, especially 
since the work by Piketty (2001) and the new literature on rising inequalities (Atkinson, 
2003). If the relationship between development and inequalities is now an ‘inverted’ Kuznets 
curve, we expect a positive relationship for the sample of countries in our estimations.  
                                                 
6 Another advantage of the GDP per capita variable is to make sure that inward FDI does not merely pick up the 
impact of the level of economic development on inequality.  
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Inflation. We include the inflation rate to check for the macroeconomic environment which is 
likely to affect income distribution. Inflation erodes real wages and disproportionately affects 
those within the bottom percentiles of income distribution, thus increasing inequalities. 
Technological progress. Technological development is proxied by the growth rate in the 
share of information and communication technology (ICT) capital in the total capital stock. 
This ICT capital stock has risen rapidly over the past 20 years. This technology is 
interconnected with globalization, as international trade in services is permitted by 
development of such technology. Technical progress is often seen to be skill biased, and may 
be a complement to international trade to explain rising inequalities (see for example the 
survey by Chusseau et al., 2008). 
Institutional context on the labor market. We introduce several variables reflecting labor 
market characteristics and the influence of trade unions on wage setting. The trade union 
density is calculated as the total union membership (less self-employed and retired) weighted 
by the total dependent labor force. We could expect that a country with a greater share of 
people engaged in trade unions has lower wage inequalities. We use two indicators of 
involvement in wage setting, one for the trade unions (Confederal involvement) and one for 
the government (Government involvement). We could expect that both trade unions and 
governments want to limit inequalities. We also consider the bargaining level at which wages 
are determined. We expect that the income distribution tends towards more inequalities under 
plant-level wage setting (the variable takes a value equal to 1) than under central wage setting 
with sanctions (the variable takes a value equal to 4). Finally, we introduce the Herfindahl 
index of union concentration across all confederations. The higher the concentration the 
greater their margin of maneuver and the greater their ability to limit inequalities.   
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4.  Empirical specification 
As time series dominate the cross section, we need to check the stationarity of our variables. 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) have developed panel-based unit root tests which depend on the 
mean of the individual Dickey-Fuller t-statistics of each unit in the panel. It has been shown 
that panel unit root tests are more powerful than unit root tests applied to individual series 
because the time series dimension is enhanced by the number of cross sections (Baltagi, 
2001). This test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Several 
procedures have been advocated to test for a unit root with panel data techniques. The main 
difference between them concerns assumptions about the heterogeneity of the data-generating 
model. It appears that heterogeneity has first been introduced via fixed effects and then via the 
autoregressive dynamic structures ρi:  
 
i;t i i t i i;t-1 i;ty  =  + t +  + y  +       (1)
  
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) study the small sample properties of unit root tests in panels with 
heterogeneous dynamics. From results displayed in table A.2, most of our variables of interest 
are difference stationary (our three inequalities variables, our three openness variables, GDP 
per capita and the stock of inward FDI): in level, the null hypothesis of a unit root is never 
rejected for these variables but rejection is accepted at the 1% level when the variables are in 
first difference. However, the education variable, the inflation rate, the technological progress 
proxy and institutional variables are level stationary. Rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit 
root is accepted at the 1% level for these variables expressed both in level and in first 
difference This implies that they are short-run determinants of inequalities, but without long-
run effect.  
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Due to the presence of unit roots in our main variables, panel cointegration tests are 
conducted to see whether there is a long-run equilibrium between our variables. We use 
Pedroni’s (1999) cointegration tests as it allows for considerable heterogeneity in fixed 
effects, individual deterministic trends and slope coefficients of the cointegrating vectors. 
Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the residual is also integrated of order one ( i = 
1, i ):  
i;t i i;t t 1 i;t Mi mi;t i;ty  =  +  +  + x  +...+ x  +        with i;t i i;t-1 i;t =  + u     (2) 
These tests run individual cointegrating regressions for each member, collect estimated 
residuals and compute either pooled panel root test, or group mean unit root test. In each case, 
rejection of the null hypothesis means that the variables under consideration are cointegrated. 
For a sufficient time dimension (T>20), these tests have a standard normal distribution and 
give the same quality of results. If some of our variables are cointegrated, there is a risk of 
fallacious regression using standard estimation techniques. Results provided in table A.3 
indicate that we cannot accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration between each 
independent variable and the inequalities variable. Independent variables are cointegrated 
between each other and must not be included simultaneously: we will estimate the long-run 
relationship between inequalities and each openness variable separately7. However, the 
inward stock of FDI and the GDP per capita are not cointegrated, so we can introduce them in 
the same cointegration equation.  
 
When variables are cointegrated, we have to estimate the long-run relationship between them.   
A fallacious regression might be obtained if we use standard estimation techniques. Although 
the OLS regression is super-consistent, it is also asymptotically biased in general (Pedroni, 
                                                 
7 For a set of n variables, there can be up to n-1 independent cointegrating vectors (Harris, 1995). If explanatory 
variables were cointegrated among them, there would more than n-1 cointegrating vectors. So we do not put 
explanatory variables that are cointegrated between them simultaneously in the regression.  
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2000 ; Kao and Chen, 1995). While this is a second order effect for the conventional single 
series estimator, for panels, as N grows large, the effect has the potential to become first 
order. The reason is that the nonstationary regressors are endogenously determined. Efficient 
methods like Fully Modified (FMOLS) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS) are required. Kao and 
Chiang (2000) study the finite sample properties of the OLS, FMOLS and DOLS estimators 
in cointegrated regressions. They show that the OLS estimator has a non-negligible bias in a 
finite sample, and that the FMOLS estimator does not improve the OLS in general. Finally, 
the DOLS estimator outperforms the other estimators, particularly in terms of mean-bias. We 
thus choose this method to estimate the following cointegration relationship. The 
cointegration equation employed in this paper is the following:  
; ; ; ; ; 1,..., ; 1,...,i t i t i t s i t s i t
s
y x x for i N t T  

 

        (3) 
Where β is the cointegrating coefficient. DOLS uses the past and future values of the variation 
of the explanatory variable as additional regressors. It allows for heterogeneity across 
countries (through individual-specific time trends, individual-specific fixed effects and time-
specific effects). 
 
In a second step, we estimate long and short-run relationships by using a panel-based error 
correction model (ECM)8. It permits us to establish how the short run varies from the long-run 
relationship, and more precisely, how the economy adjusts itself to disturbances over time.  
The specification of our Error Correction Model is: 
; ; 1 ; ; 1
; 1 ; 1
i t i t i t i t
i t i t t
INEQ INEQ Openness trade Openness trade
Error Correction Term X
  
  
 
 
      
     
(4) 
INEQ represents our dependent variable, the degree of inequality, Openness trade is our main 
explainatory variable and X is a vector of control variables. The time-specific effect, ψt, is 
                                                 
8 For a recent reference on cointegration and ECM with panel data, see Francis et al. (2007). See also Kale 
(2001) for an application of cointegration and ECM on longitudinal data. 
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included to capture aggregate shocks, which can appear in any year. The error correction term 
comes from the residuals of the long-run relationship estimated using the DOLS method. The 
coefficient on the error correction term, η, gives the adjustment rate at which the gap between 
inequalities and the variable of interest is closed. If η is negative and significant, the model is 
an ECM.  
Since this is a dynamic panel data model, an instrumental variable estimator must be used to 
deal with the correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variables. First, we 
implement heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors, because the 
Wooldridge test (2002) for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data 
model implies the existence of arbitrary serial correlation. Second, the model can be estimated 
using a specific dynamic panel data methodology. However, our data set contains a small 
number of observations in the cross section (10 countries) and a relatively large time 
dimension (26 years): in this case, Judson and Owen (1999) show that the LSDVC (Least 
Square Dummy Variable Corrected) estimator, suggested by Kiviet (1995) outperforms 
alternative estimators like the GMM-system estimator developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998).
 
5.  Long-run equilibrium relationship between international trade and inequality 
Here, we examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between international trade and 
inequalities, using the Dynamic OLS estimator (DOLS)9. Table 1 gives the mean group panel 
DOLS estimates for the full sample over the period 1980-2005.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Given the annual data, the lags on the DOLS were taken to be first-order.  
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Table 1. DOLS estimates with year dummies 
 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 
Total trade 
openness 
0.01*** 
(6.73) 
0.0007 
(0.83) 
0.008*** 
(8.23) 
Trade openness in 
goods 
0.007** 
(2.29) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
0.005*** 
(4.45) 
Trade openness in 
services 
0.06*** 
(6.77) 
0.007** 
(2.22) 
0.03*** 
(5.88) 
FDI stocks 0.005*** 
(4.92) 
0.001*** 
(4.02) 
0.004*** 
(8.52) 
GDP per capita 0.006*** 
(3.25) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
0.001** 
(2.04) 
    
Notes: t-Student in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
First, total international trade and trade in goods have similar effects on inequalities. 
Coefficients have the same sign, size and significance. International trade exhibits a 
significant positive long-run effect on D9/D1 and D5/D1, whereas the coefficient of the 
D9/D5 variable is positive but not significant. This result can be linked to traditional HOS 
predictions. Countries of our sample are more abundant in high-skilled and medium-skilled 
labor relatively to other countries, and especially southern countries. International trade 
increases top incomes relatively to low incomes.  
Second, international trade in commercial services has a significant positive impact on each of 
our three inequality indicators at the sample level. Contrary to international trade in goods, 
international trade in services increases inequalities between top incomes and median incomes 
(D9/D5). In the long run, trade in services increases the gap between low paid workers and 
the other points of the income distribution but also between median incomes and top incomes.  
Markusen and Strand’s (2008) theoretical work provides a potential explanation for this 
result. As low-skilled activities, medium-skilled activities tend to be offshore, whereas high-
skilled activities stay in the domestic country. These kinds of services (financial services, 
patents and fees, insurance services, information services, or business services) are mainly 
traded between northern countries and concern highly qualified workers. In this case, we can 
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also use the argumentation of Manasse and Turrini (2001): international differentiation on 
varieties and competition on quality lead to a rise in the skill premium. In addition, the 
liberalization of trade in services has led to a surge in outsourcing (Jones and Kierzkowski, 
1999, 2001, and 2005), for low-skilled and medium-skilled activities, which could lead to a 
rise in inequalities in the home country.  
Concerning the other variables, as FDI stocks and GDP per capita are not cointegrated, we 
introduce them simultaneously in the cointegration equation. As expected, there is a positive 
and highly significant long-run relationship between FDI stocks and inequalities. In 
developed countries, inward FDI is mainly concentrated in the tertiary sector (UNCTAD, 
2008). FDI stocks variable is then a complement to international trade, especially to trade in 
services, as the variable of FDI stocks also increases D9/D5. We also find a positive and 
significant long-run relationship between GDP per capita and income inequalities, except on 
D9/D5.  
 
6.  ECM Results 
Tables 2 and 3 display the results for the Error Correction Model estimated using the IV 
method. An important issue using the IV method is the validity of instruments. We provide 
results from Kleibergen-Paap test and Hansen J-test to deal with this question. The former is 
an underidentification test while the latter is an overidentification test. It is often stated that 
there must be at least as many instruments as endogenous variables. On the one hand, 
underidentification is observed when there are more endogenous regressors than the number 
of valid instruments. When Kleibergen-Paap test statistic passes the critical value of 10, the 
null of underidentification can be rejected. On the other hand, when there are too many, the 
instruments can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous 
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components and biasing coefficient estimates. Hansen-J-test determines if the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. High values and high probability values respectively for the 
Kleibergen-Paap statistics and for the Hansen J-tests10 do not call into question the validity of 
the results of any of the regressions. The same results are obtained using the LSDVC 
estimator (table A.2 in appendix). We check for potential multicollinearity between 
regressors: for all our variables, the Variance Inflation Factor is lower than 7. These results 
confirm that our variables do not suffer from any multicollinearity problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 For LSDVC estimations, the test of over-identifying restrictions comes from the first-stage regression results. 
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Table 2. ECM results (openness variables) 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 
Δ INEQ D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 
Method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
                    
Δ INEQ (t-1) -0.3268*** -0.2500*** -0.3533*** -0.5675** -0.2489*** -0.3614*** -0.3178*** -0.2438*** -0.3621*** 
 (0.0797) (0.0926) (0.1176) (0.2473) (0.0922) (0.1172) (0.0793) (0.0922) (0.1301) 
Error Correction 
Term 
-0.1517*** -0.1789*** -0.1508*** -0.1172** -0.1851*** -0.1301** -0.1614*** -0.1910*** -0.1116 
(0.0416) (0.0561) (0.0542) (0.0507) (0.0542) (0.0528) (0.0424) (0.0567) (0.0735) 
Δ Total trade 
openness 
0.0007 -0.0003 0.0019       
(0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0012)       
Δ Total trade 
openness (t-1) 
0.0074*** 0.0006 0.0033***       
(0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0011)       
Δ Trade openness 
in goods 
   -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0021    
   (0.0040) (0.0016) (0.0014)    
Δ Trade openness 
in goods (t-1) 
   0.0105*** 0.0012 0.0043***    
   (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0013)    
Δ Trade openness 
in services 
      -0.0040 0.0003 -0.0025 
      (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0019) 
Δ Trade openness 
in services (t-1) 
      -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 
      (0.0117) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Education (t-1) -0.0230* -0.0053 -0.0101* -0.0202 -0.0053 -0.0097* -0.0200 -0.0056 -0.0056 
 (0.0139) (0.0076) (0.0058) (0.0151) (0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0143) (0.0075) (0.0059) 
Techn Progress    
(t-1) -0.0813 -0.0674 0.0081 -0.1352 -0.0662 -0.0014 -0.0630 -0.0632 0.0050 
 (0.0863) (0.0446) (0.0387) (0.0963) (0.0441) (0.0386) (0.0943) (0.0454) (0.0412) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.0051* 0.0009 0.0026** 0.0043 0.0009 0.0025** 0.0037 0.0008 0.0016 
 (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Trade Union 
density (t-1) 
-0.2742** -0.0520 -0.1464** -0.2213* -0.0481 -0.1274* -0.2453* -0.0602 -0.1165* 
(0.1343) (0.0730) (0.0685) (0.1341) (0.0705) (0.0679) (0.1355) (0.0721) (0.0692) 
Confederal 
Involvement (t-1) 
-0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0001 
(0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
Government 
Involvement  (t-1) 
0.0016 0.0018 -0.0005 0.0022 0.0018 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0018 -0.0007 
(0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Bargaining Level 
(t-1) 
-0.0051 -0.0067 0.0044 -0.0114 -0.0072 0.0029 -0.0058 -0.0068 0.0034 
(0.0106) (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0114) (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0109) (0.0051) (0.0044) 
Herfindahl index 
(t-1) 
-0.2426*** -0.0649** -0.0780*** -0.2667*** -0.0690** -0.0825*** -0.2433*** -0.0644** -0.0722*** 
(0.0592) (0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0665) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0592) (0.0268) (0.0263) 
                    
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-squared 0.3320 0.2509 0.2816 0.2734 0.2554 0.2793 0.3065 0.2525 0.2322 
Underidentification 
test 41.861***  43.340*** 27.900***  41.540*** 43.055*** 27.454*** 40.160***  44.283*** 27.462*** 
Weak 
identification test 209.001*** 375.018***  196.188*** 
 
203.015*** 363.860*** 198.586***  196.786*** 379.099*** 199.832*** 
Hansen J- test 
(Prob) 0.6835  0.2159  0.5610 0.6787 0.2251 0.5743  0.8212 0.2098 0.6704 
 
Notes: Estimates include year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3. ECM results (other variables) 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
Δ INEQ D9/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D9/D5 D5/D1 D5/D1 
Method LSDVC IV LSDVC IV LSDVC IV 
       
Δ INEQ (t-1) -0.1858** -0.2934*** -0.1947** -0.2327** -0.2114*** -0.3565*** 
 (0.0734) (0.0819) (0.0818) (0.0944) (0.0754) (0.1292) 
Error Correction -0.1268*** -0.1339*** -0.1791*** -0.2040*** -0.0417 -0.0073 
Term (0.0438) (0.0423) (0.0612) (0.0547) (0.0474) (0.0699) 
Δ FDI stocks 0.0023 0.0021 0.0013 0.0013* -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
Δ FDI stocks  0.0013 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 
(t-1) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Δ GDP per capita 0.0024 0.0020 0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 0.0008 
 (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Δ GDP per capita  -0.0042 -0.0046** -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0019* 
(t-1) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Education (t-1) -0.0111 -0.0183 -0.0076 -0.0076 0.0021 -0.0016 
 (0.0131) (0.0142) (0.0051) (0.0074) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Techn Progress  -0.0489 -0.0615 -0.0570* -0.0567 0.0054 0.0030 
(t-1) (0.0758) (0.0935) (0.0344) (0.0435) (0.0326) (0.0421) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.0023 0.0030 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 0.0012 
 (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
Trade Union  -0.1459 -0.2794* -0.0549 -0.0881 -0.0721 -0.1204* 
density (t-1) (0.1707) (0.1427) (0.0801) (0.0734) (0.0717) (0.0708) 
Confederal  0.0026 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0019 0.0011 
Involvement (t-1) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Government  -0.0021 0.0006 0.0013 0.0019 -0.0022** -0.0014 
Involvement  (t-1) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Bargaining Level  -0.0123* -0.0070 -0.0081*** -0.0064 0.0003 0.0014 
(t-1) (0.0065) (0.0109) (0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0045) 
Herfindahl index  -0.2170* -0.2290*** -0.0599 -0.0613** -0.0548 -0.0463* 
(t-1) (0.1134) (0.0628) (0.0467) (0.0264) (0.0491) (0.0262) 
Observations 240 220 240 220 240 220 
R-squared / 0.3023 / 0.2645 / 0.2214 
Underidentification test /  41.614*** / 44.114*** / 29.709*** 
Weak identification test /  193.171*** / 373.030*** / 240.554*** 
Hansen J-test (Prob) 0.9845 0.7472 0.9891  0.2299 0.9961  0.5866 
       
Notes: Estimates include year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
We first note that the lagged first difference endogenous variable is always very significant 
and takes a value between -0.24 and -0.56 in all specifications, which confirms autoregressive 
specification (4). The error correction coefficients have statistically significant negative signs 
in all regressions. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the error correction terms 
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implies that, if there are deviations from the long-run equilibrium, short-run adjustments will 
be made to the dependent variable to re-establish the long run equilibrium.  
The impact of openness variables is only significant with the lagged variables, which 
indicates that increased openness always takes one period to have an impact on inequality. 
The first set of regressions introduces the aggregate openness variable commonly used in the 
literature to study the link between international trade and inequality. It shows that total 
international trade has a significant and positive short-run impact both on D9/D1 and D5/D1 
(a positive relationship has been established in the long run in the previous section). As our 
sample is composed of developed countries, several explanations can be provided (that we 
developed in the previous section), but at this aggregate level, it is not possible to define 
which one dominates. Consequently it seems particularly relevant to look at a more 
disaggregated level.  
The second set of regressions confirms this result for the goods sectors. Growing north-south 
trade is very likely to enhance inequalities. It could confirm the HOS prediction as in the 
previous section. An increase in the trade in goods has a short-run impact on inequalities 
between top incomes and low incomes, and also between median incomes and low incomes. 
The results suggest that when trade openness increases in a developed country, income 
inequalities will rise in the following year and will persist in the long run.  
The third set of regressions shows that whatever the inequalities indicator, we observe no 
significant influence of trade in services on inequalities in the short run (table 2, columns 7 to 
9). All the theoretical mechanisms of international trade in services and inequalities 
(Markusen and Strand, 2008; Manasse and Turrini, 2001; Jones and Kierzkowski, 1999, 2001, 
and 2005) seem to be invalid in the short run. How to explain the absence of effect in the 
short run? From a theoretical point of view, it is well known that short run effect can be 
substantially different from long run effect (see Chao and Yu, 1997; Das, 2002; Anwar, 
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2010). From an empirical point of view, our results corroborate the presence of dynamic or 
cumulative effects of the trade of services through the years. Due to the acceleration of 
international trade in services in the 2000’s, the trend of inequality is predicted to become 
sharper in developed countries in the following years, ceteris paribus 
 
Table 3 gives the results when the main variables of interest are the stock of inward FDI and 
the GDP per capita. Both variables have long-run effects on inequalities. However in the short 
run, the stock of FDI has no significant effect on inequalities. As for GDP per capita, 
significant effects are only observed using the IV method: when GDP per capita increases in 
period t, inequalities between top incomes and low incomes (and between median incomes 
and low incomes) decrease in the following period. However in the long run, there is a rise in 
inequalities. It seems that the effect differs between the long run and the short run.  
For the control variables, note that sizes and significances do not vary between columns, 
which indicates that our results are robust whatever the method used. The education variable 
has the expected negative effect on inequality, but the coefficient is not always significant. 
This result is not surprising, as it is likely that it takes times for education to produce effects. 
Concerning the labor market characteristics, the coefficient of the trade union density and the 
Herfindahl index variables are significant and negative as expected. Finally, the inflation 
variable has a positive impact on inequality, but not always significant and the coefficient 
related to technical progress sometimes has a negative and significant sign. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The objective of the article was to distinguish the effect of international trade in goods and 
services on inequalities to determine if the recent rise in international trade in services 
explains growing inequalities in OECD countries. Short and long-run estimations have been 
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performed and give the following results. First, we show that the relationship between 
international trade and inequalities differs between goods and services: in the long run, trade 
in commercial services increases inequalities not only between top incomes and low incomes, 
but also between top incomes and median incomes, whereas this latter effect is not verified 
for the goods sector. These results indicate that it is relevant to take into account the specific 
case of services. Second, in the short run, international trade in services has no significant 
impact on inequalities. This indicates that it is appropriate to distinguish short run and long 
run effects.   
 
Finally, the main results of the article suggest that not only low-income workers, but also 
median-income workers in the services sector, are threatened by international trade to 
experience rising inequalities compared to top-income workers, in developed economies. As 
wage inequality is a relative measure of the labour incomes between different groups, this 
result should be qualified. Indeed, our paper studies the impact of international trade on the 
relative positions of high-income workers and low-income workers, between high-income 
workers and median income workers and between median income workers and low-income 
workers. Hence, in terms of relative advantages, low-income and medium-income workers 
lose from the trade in services compared to high incomes workers. But it does not mean that 
in terms of absolute advantage, the situation of these particular groups worsens: indeed, their 
situation may simply worsen more than that of the high-income group, or experience less 
improvement than that of the high-income group of workers. The harmful (relative) effects of 
trade in services on wage inequality highlighted in this article suggest that developed 
countries need to develop high-tech sectors (which require high-skilled workers) and to 
pursue higher education. Otherwise, as international trade of services accelerated in the 
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2000’s, the trend of the rising inequalities observed in northern countries could be reinforced 
in the next decades 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Data Sources and summary statistics 
variable Source Name and definition Mean  Std.Dev 
Inequality 
variable 
OECD D9/D1 2.9362 0.61767 
D9/D5
 
1.786 0.16902 
D5/D1
 
1.6272 0.19610 
International 
trade variables 
CHELEM-CEPII Total trade openness
 
27.437 13.021 
Trade openness in goods
 
21.558 10.276 
Trade openness in 
services
 
2.5875 1.6800 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
stocks  
IMF-International Financial 
Statistics 
FDI stocks (in % GDP)
 
14.921 14.530 
Gross Domestic 
Product per 
capita  
IMF-International Financial 
Statistics 
GDP per capita ($1000s)
 
20.399 7.3802 
Inflation CHELEM IMF-International 
Financial Statistics 
Inflation rate
 
3.6309 3.2226 
Education 
variable 
Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.W. 
(2001)  
Education: Average years 
of schooling of the total 
population aged 25 and 
over 
9.5845 1.2377 
Technological 
Progress 
EUKLEMS (2007) Techn Progress: Growth 
rate in the share of 
information and 
communication 
technology capital in the 
total capital stock
 
3.3625 2.5743 
Labor market 
characteristics  
Golden M., Wallerstein M. 
and Lange P. (2006)  
Union Centralization Among 
Advanced Industrial Societies: 
An Empirical Study of 
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 
Countries, 1950-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Union Density
 
0.38618 0.23259 
Confederal involvement in 
wage-setting
 
3.6231 2.7390 
Government involvement in 
wage-setting 
5.3385 3.2515 
Bargaining level at which 
wages are determined 
2.1923 0.97138 
 
Herfindahl index of union 
concentration across all 
confederations 
0.65301 0.25794 
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Table A.2: Im-Pesaran-Shin stationarity test: tb statistic with one lag 
Statistic t-bar Variables in level Variables in first 
difference 
Result 
D9/D1 -2.145 -3.501*** I(1) 
D9/D5 -2.384 -3.823*** I(1) 
D5/D1 -1.695 -3.413*** I(1) 
Total trade openness
 
-2.121 -3.810*** I(1) 
Total openness in goods
 
-2.257 -3.856*** I(1) 
Total openness in services
 
-1.492 -3.673*** I(1) 
Education level
 
-3.839*** -3.232*** I(0) 
Foreign Direct Investment
 
-1.832 -2.715** I(1) 
Gross Domestic Product Per 
Capita
 
-2.273 -3.755*** I(1) 
Inflation rate
 
-3.437*** -3.673*** I(0) 
Confederal Involvement -2.678*** -5.259*** I(0) 
Government Involvement -3.792*** -4.854*** I(0) 
Bargaining Level -2.592*** -4.582*** I(0) 
Herfindal Index -2.516*** -4.124*** I(0) 
Trade Union Density -2.468*** -2.998*** I(0) 
Technological progress -2.576*** -3.747*** I(0) 
Time fixed effects and trends are introduced in each specification ADF. The IPS test statistic, 
in the limit, follows a standard normal distribution. *, ** and *** implies rejection of null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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    Table A.3: Cointegration tests  
Dependent Variable D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 FDI 
Independent variables 
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A deterministic intercept and a deterministic trend are included for the Pedroni tests. Level of significance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, * for 
10%. 
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Table A.4. ECM results using LSDVC estimator (openness variables) 
 
Δ INEQ D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 
Method LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC 
                    
Δ INEQ (t-1) -0.1991** -0.2100** -0.1924** -0.2051** -0.2074** -0.2030** -0.1966*** -0.2017** -0.1996*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0838) (0.0850) (0.0828) (0.0844) (0.0865) (0.0752) (0.0818) (0.0772) 
Error Correction -0.1339*** -0.1553*** -0.1438*** -0.1280*** -0.1594*** -0.1248*** -0.1459*** -0.1670*** -0.1258*** 
Term (0.0416) (0.0572) (0.0487) (0.0407) (0.0566) (0.0482) (0.0445) (0.0616) (0.0484) 
Δ Total trade  0.0008 -0.0002 0.0015       
openness (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0010)       
Δ Total trade  0.0047*** -0.0001 0.0024***       
Openness (t-1) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007)       
Δ Trade openness    0.0010 -0.0001 0.0014    
in goods    (0.0032) (0.0013) (0.0014)    
Δ Trade openness    0.0065*** 0.0004 0.0032***    
in goods (t-1)    (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0010)    
Δ Trade openness       -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0018 
in services       (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Δ Trade openness       0.0051 0.0006 0.0003 
in services (t-1)       (0.0166) (0.0071) (0.0074) 
Education -0.0103 -0.0047 -0.0032 -0.0097 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0122 -0.0055 -0.0012 
 (0.0120) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0119) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0119) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
Techn Progress (t-1) -0.0577 -0.0629* 0.0103 -0.0711 -0.0617* 0.0020 -0.0455 -0.0596 0.0095 
 (0.0820) (0.0364) (0.0352) (0.0819) (0.0363) (0.0353) (0.0835) (0.0378) (0.0354) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.0043 0.0005 0.0025 0.0042 0.0005 0.0024 0.0030 0.0005 0.0016 
 (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Trade Union  -0.1216 -0.0194 -0.0837 -0.0992 -0.0184 -0.0721 -0.1158 -0.0282 -0.0668 
density (t-1) (0.1592) (0.0741) (0.0693) (0.1587) (0.0744) (0.0696) (0.1692) (0.0781) (0.0708) 
Confederal 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0021 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0022 -0.0004 0.0012 
involvement (t-1)  (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Government -0.0024 0.0011 -0.0021** -0.0026 0.0010 -0.0021** -0.0021 0.0011 -0.0019* 
invlovement (t-1) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Bargaining Level -0.0114* -0.0086*** 0.0020 -0.0131** -0.0089*** 0.0010 -0.0111* -0.0085*** 0.0015 
(t-1) (0.0064) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0024) 
Herfindahl index -0.2221** -0.0633 -0.0771 -0.2354** -0.0666 -0.0817* -0.2282** -0.0634 -0.0771 
(t-1) (0.1086) (0.0457) (0.0474) (0.1100) (0.0461) (0.0479) (0.1121) (0.0459) (0.0499) 
                    
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
level. 
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Figure A5. Development of the main variables over time 
 
 
Trends in D9/D1 indicators for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
 
 
Trends in D5/D1 indicators for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Trends in D9/D5 indicators for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
 
Trends in openness trade of services for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Trends in openness trade of goods for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
 
 
Trends in total openness trade (goods + services) for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Trends in GDP per capita for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
 
 
Trends in foreign direct investment stocks (in % of GDP), for the sample countries, 
1980-2005 
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Trends in inflation for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Trends in education (average number of schooling years) 
 for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Annual growth of the information and communication stock (%)  
 for the sample countries, 1980-2005 
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Figure A6. Scatter plots between the main variables 
 
 
Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and foreign direct investment (stocks, in % of 
GDP), 1980-2005 
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Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and openness trade of services, 1980-2005 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and openness trade of goods, 1980-2005 
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Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and total openness trade (goods + services), 1980-
2005 
 
 
Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and inflation, 1980-2005 
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Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and GDP per capita, 1980-2005 
 
Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and education, 1980-2005 
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Scatter plots of inequalities indicators and the annual growth of the information and 
communication stock (%), 1980-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
